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1. Introduction
Covariates that have full support (i.e., supported on the whole Euclidean space)
provide an elegant and powerful approach for establishing identification in many dis-
crete outcome models.1 Existence of such covariates is often necessary for nonpara-
metric identification of distributions of latent variables.2 “Identification-at-infinity”
arguments are based on existence of covariates with full support.3 However, finding
such covariates in applied work is often problematic.
In this paper, I show that common parametric assumptions about the distribu-
tion of some unobservables (e.g. one normally distributed random coefficient in a
model with multiple random coefficients) can fully restore the identification power
of covariates with full support, even if covariates are in fact bounded. I provide
two results connecting semiparametric discrete outcome models with covariates that
have bounded support and (non)parametric discrete outcome models with special
covariates that have full support. The first result is general and can be applied to
a large class of semiparametric models. However, it requires a preliminary identi-
fication of a finite-dimensional parameter by using some auxiliary arguments. The
second result does not require any extra identification steps, and uses one of the most
popular parametrizations in applied work – the Gaussian distribution. I apply the
proposed approaches to three well-known models: multinomial choice models with
random coefficients, bundles models, and finite games of complete information.
The results of this paper rest on two commonly used assumptions. First, I assume
existence of excluded (special) covariates that affect the distribution over outcomes
via a latent index. Second, I impose commonly used parametric restrictions on
the distribution of this index (e.g., the Gumbel or the Gaussian distribution). If
the distribution of the index is sufficiently “rich”, then I show how to identify the
1See, for example, Manski (1985), Matzkin (1992), Ichimura and Thompson (1998), Lewbel
(1998), Lewbel (2000), Tamer (2003), Matzkin (2007), Berry and Haile (2009), Bajari et al. (2010),
Gautier and Kitamura (2013), Fox and Gandhi (2016), Dunker et al. (2017), Fox and Lazzati (2017),
and Fox et al. (2018).
2Full support assumption is not necessary if it is assumed that latent variables have bounded
support. In this case the support of the special covariates have to be large enough to cover the
support of unobservables.
3For example, Manski (1988), Heckman (1990), and Tamer (2003).
2
distribution over outcomes conditional on the realization of the observed covariates
and the latent index. Since the index distribution is usually assumed to have full
support, I can treat the latent index as observed covariate with full support and
apply any identification technique that requires existence of such covariates.
The index has different interpretation in different settings. For instance, in ran-
dom coefficients model one of the random coefficients can be treated as the latent
index. In games, the role of the index is played by a component of random utilities
corresponding to different outcomes. “Richness” of the latent index distribution is
formalized by a notion of bounded completeness.4
This paper also contributes to the literature on partially identified models. I
show that in many partially identified models the identified sets are “thin” in the
following sense. The model parameters (including infinite-dimensional ones) are
identified up to a finite-dimensional parameter of a lower dimension. This finding may
lead to substantial computational gains in constructing confidence sets for partially
identified parameters (e.g. Chen et al. (2011)) and sheds some light on the properties
of identified sets in these models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a motivating example. In
Section 3 I describe the setting and derive general identification results. Section 4
specializes the results from Section 3 for widely used normally distributed latent
variables. In Sections 5 I apply the result from Section 3 to three different discrete
outcome models. Section 6 concludes. All proofs can be found in Appendix A.
4Completeness of a family distribution is a well-known concept both in the Statistics and Econo-
metrics literature. See for example Mattner et al. (1993), Newey and Powell (2003), Chernozhukov
and Hansen (2005), Blundell et al. (2007), Chernozhukov et al. (2007), Hu and Schennach (2008),
Andrews (2011), Darolles et al. (2011), and d’Haultfoeuille (2011).
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2. Motivating Example: Binary Choice
Consider a simple single agent binary choice problem.5 A utility maximizing
agent has to choose y ∈ Y = {0, 1}. The utility of alternative y = 0 is normalized to
0. The utility of option y = 1 is
z2,1v1 + g1. (1)
Random variables v1 and g1 represent the random slope coefficient corresponding to
covariate z2,1 ∈ Z2,1 ⊆ R and the random intercept, respectively.
The objective of the econometrician is to recover the c.d.f. of g1, Fg1 , from
observed distribution of choices y and covariates z. Typically it is assumed that
v1 = 1 a.s., and z2,1 and g1 are independent. In this case the main identifying
conditions is
Pr(y = 1|z2,1 = z2,1) = 1− Fg1(−z2,1),
for all z2,1 ∈ Z2,1. Hence, if g1 is supported on R, then nonparametric identification
of its distribution can be achieved if and only if z2,1 has full support. Next I will
show how another commonly used assumption about v1 can lead to identification of
Fg1 even if all observed covariates have bounded support.
Assume that there exists a covariate z1 ∈ Z1 ⊆ R such that for z = (z1, z2,1)
T ∈
Z = Z1 × Z2,1
v1|(z = z) ∼ N(β0 + β1z1, 1), ∀z ∈ Z,
where β1 6= 0 and N(µ, σ
2) denotes the normal distribution with mean µ and variance
σ2. For this section only I assume that β = (β0, β1)
T is known or can be identified.
Later on I will show how one can pointidentify β. Assuming that g1 is independent
5Throughout the paper, deterministic vectors and functions are denoted by lower-case regular
font Latin letters (e.g., x), random objects by bold letters (e.g., x). Capital letters are used to denote
supports of random variables (e.g., x ∈ X). I denote the support of a conditional distribution of x
conditional on z = z by Xz. Also, given a family x = (xk)k∈K and a particular index value k ∈ K, I
use the notation x−k for (xj)j∈K\{k}. Fx(·) (fx(·)) and Fx|z(·|z) (fx|z(·|z)) denote the c.d.f. (p.d.f.)
of x and x|z = z, respectively.
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of z and v1, we can rewrite (1) as
z2,1(β0 + β1z1 + e1) + g1,
where e1 is a standard normal random variable that is independent of z.
6
The key step is to show that we can identify
Pr(y = 1|z = z,v1 = v1)
for all v1 ∈ R and z ∈ Z. If we can identify Pr(y = 1|z = ·,v1 = ·), then we
can analyze the model as if v1 is observed. In this case z2,1v1 becomes an observed
special covariate with full support since v1 is supported on R. By using variation in
v1 we can recover Fg1 even if the support of z is bounded. In other words, the above
binary choice model with just one normally distributed random slope coefficient with
bounded covariates, in terms of identification features, is equivalent to the binary
choice model where the utility from choosing y = 1 is equal to
r1 + g1, (2)
where r1 and g1 are independent, and r1 is observed covariate supported on
{r1 ∈ R : r1 = v1z2,1, v1 ∈ R, z2,1 ∈ Z2,1} = R.
It is left to show that Pr(y = 1|z = z,v1 = ·) can be identified. First, note that
under independence condition
Pr(y = 1|z1 = z1, z2,1 = z2,1,v1 = v1) = Pr(y = 1|z2,1 = z2,1,v1 = v1).
Second, note that for any fixed z2,1 we have the following integral equation
Pr(y = 1|z1 = z1, z2,1 = z2,1) =
∫
R
Pr(y = 1|z2,1 = z2,1,v1 = v)φ(v − (β0 + β1z1))dv,
for all z1 ∈ Z1. Since variation in z1 does not affect Pr(y = 1|z2,1 = z2,1,v1 = ·),
we can use this variation to identify it. In other words, if the family of normal
6Assumption that the variance of e1 is 1 is a scale normalization.
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distributions {φ(· − β0 − β1z1) : z1 ∈ Z1} is sufficiently “rich”, then the integral
equation has a unique solution. For discrete distributions the “richness” condition
is usually characterized by the rank condition. For continuous distributions the
“richness” condition is associated with a notion of “completeness”. In our example,
the “completeness” condition is satisfied since the family of {φ(· − β0 − β1z1) : z1 ∈
Z1} is complete if int(Z1) 6= ∅.
7 Since the choice of z2,1 was arbitrary, we recover
Pr(y = 1|z2,1 = ·,v1 = ·) and thus can work with well-known model (2).
Two important assumptions needed for the result to hold are: (i) existence of a
parametric index v1 such that the choices are affected by some excluded covariates
only through the index; and (ii) the distribution of the index conditional on excluded
covariates is sufficiently rich (complete). The rest of the paper generalizes these key
assumptions to environments with multiple agents and outcomes, and establishes
identification of β.
3. General Model
Each instance of the environment is characterized by an endogenous outcome y
from a known finite set Y , a vector of observed exogenous characteristics x ∈ X ⊆
R
dx , dx <∞, that can be partitioned into x = (z
T, wT)T, and a vector of unobserved
structural variables v ∈ V ⊆ Rdv .8 It is assumed that the econometrician observes
the joint distribution of (y,xT)T.
Assumption 1 (Exclusion Restrictions) There exist Y ∗ ⊆ Y and h0 : Y
∗ ×W × V →
[0, 1], such that
Pr(y = y|z = z,w = w,v = v) = h0(y, w, v),
for all y ∈ Y ∗, x = (zT, wT)T ∈ X, and v ∈ V .
7int(Z1) denotes the interior of Z1.
8My analysis allows for countable sets of outcomes, but for the exposition purposes I focus on
finite sets.
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Assumption 1 is an exclusion restriction that requires covariates z to affect distri-
bution over some outcomes only via the distribution of the latent v. Note that the
exclusion restriction does not need to be imposed on all outcomes. For instance, in
single agent decision models one can identify the payoff parameters by observing only
the probability of choosing the outside option (e.g., Thompson (1989) and Lewbel
(2000)). Assumption 1 does not rule out existence of other latent variables (different
from v) since exclusion restrictions are imposed on the distribution over outcomes
conditional on x = x and v = v.9
The next assumption is a parametric restriction on the latent variable whose
distribution is affected by the excluded covariates z.
Assumption 2 (Bounded completeness) For every w ∈ W , there exists Z ′ ⊆ Zw such
that the family of distributions
{
Fv|z,w(·|z, w), z ∈ Z
′
}
is boundedly complete. That
is,
∀z ∈ Z ′,
∫
V
g(t)dFv|z,w(t|z, w) = 0 =⇒ g(v) = 0 a.s..
Completeness assumptions have been widely used in econometric analysis. Com-
pleteness is typically imposed on the distribution of observables (e.g. Newey and
Powell (2003)). However, many commonly used parametric restrictions on the dis-
tribution of unobservables imply Assumption 2. For instance, it is satisfied for the
Gaussian distribution and the Gumbel distribution. 10
µ(y|x) = Pr(y = y|x = x)
is known for every y ∈ Y ∗ and x ∈ X.
Proposition 3.1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, h0 is identified from µ up to Fv|x.
Proposition 3.1 implies that under exclusion restrictions if one assumes that the
latent variable has a known distribution belonging to a boundedly complete family,
then one can work with the model as if the realizations of latent variables are observed
in the data since we can identify h0(y, w, ·) = Pr(y = y|w = w,v = ·). Thus, if I
9I consider a model with unobserved heterogeneity that is not fully captured by v in Section 5.1.
10For testability of the completeness assumptions see Canay et al. (2013).
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know or can identify Fv|x (see Section 4), for identification I can interpret latent
variables (v) as observed covariates. If these latent variables have full support (e.g.
normal errors), then all identification techniques that require existence of covariates
with full support can be applied (e.g., Fox and Gandhi (2016) in the context of
random coefficients model and Bajari et al. (2010) in the context of games). In
other words, I can transform a model with covariates that have bounded support
into the model with covariates that have full support, and then use existing methods
to identify different objects of interest.
The following example demonstrates how knowing h0 can help to identify some
underlying aspects of the model.
Example 3.1 Suppose that Y = Y ∗ = {0, 1} and h0 is identified.
11 Assume that
γ(w) + v represents the utility agent gets from choosing y = 1, where γ is some
unknown function of w. Assume, moreover, that the utility from choosing y = 0
is normalized to zero. The identified h0 is consistent with the utility maximizing
behavior if and only if
h0(1, w, v) = 1 ( γ(w) + v ≥ 0 )
for almost all v ∈ V and w ∈ W . Thus, if V = R, then one can test for utility
maximizing behavior, and can identify γ(·) if the agent maximizes utility.
Proposition 3.1 establishes identification of h0 only up to Fv|x. Typically Fv|x is
known up to a finite-dimensional parameter. In Section 4 I show how one can identify
this parameter and thus h0 if Fv|x is assumed to be the Gaussian distribution. In
Section 5.3 I show how Proposition 3.1 can be used to characterize the identified set
of a partially identified game of complete information.
11For binary outcome models assuming that both outcomes satisfy the exclusion restriction is
equivalent to assuming that just one of them does.
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4. Gaussian Distribution
Proposition 3.1 can be applied with any known parametric distribution Fv|x as
long as the family of the distributions generated by the variation in excluded covari-
ates is complete. The most prominent example of such families is the exponential
family of distributions. In this section I specialize the results from the previous sec-
tion to probably one of the most common parametrization in applied work – Gaussian
errors. I show how to identify Fv|x for such models. The following assumption is
sufficient for Assumption 2 to hold.
Assumption 3 (i) The latent v satisfies
vi = z2,i[β0,i(w) + β1,i(w)z1,i + ei] a.s.
where β0,i(·) and β1,i(·), i = 1, . . . , dv, are some unknown measurable functions
such that β1,i(w) 6= 0 for all w ∈W ;
(ii) {ei}i=1,...,dv are independent identically distributed standard normal random
variables that are independent of x;
(iii) For every w ∈W the support of z|(w = w), Zw, contains an open ball;
(iv) The sign of either β0,i(w) or β1,i(w) is known for every w ∈W and i.
Assumption 3(i) is motivated by random coefficient models. The covariate z2,i can
be interpreted as choice (“product”) specific characteristic. The random coefficients
[β0,i(w) + β1,i(w)z1,i + ei] captures agent specific heterogeneity in tastes. The only
support restriction is imposed on z (Assumption 3(iii)). Non of the covariates are
assumed to have full or unbounded support. Assumptions 3(i)-(iii) are sufficient for
Assumption 2 since the family of normal distributions indexed by the mean parameter
is complete as long as the parameter space for the mean parameter contains an open
ball.12
12Any distribution from the exponential family of distributions (e.g., the Gumbel distribution)
would be sufficient for Assumption 2 to hold.
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Assumptions 3(iv) is a normalization. It requires that either the sign of the
marginal effect of z1,i or the sign of the intercept (as long at it is not equal to zero)
are known (or can be identified). In discrete outcome models with almost surely
unique equilibrium (e.g. multinomial choice) the sign of β1,i(·) can often be identified
because of monotonicity of h in utility indexes v. For instance, in multinomial choice
models the probability of choosing an outside option is decreasing in mean utilities
of other choices. Without additional restrictions the sign can not be identified as the
following example demonstrates.
Example 4.1 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3(i)-(iii) are satisfied with dv = 1 and
x = (z11, z21)
T. Take y ∈ Y ∗ and note that
µ(y|x) =
∫ +∞
−∞
h0(y, v1)φ(v1/z2,1 − β0,1 − β1,1z1,1)dv1 =
=
∫ +∞
−∞
h0(y, v1)φ(−v1/z2,1 + β0,1 + β1,1z1,1)dv1 =
=
∫ +∞
−∞
h0(y,−v1)φ(v1/z2,1 + β0,1 + β1,1z1,1)dv1 =
=
∫ +∞
−∞
h0(y,−v1)φ(v1/z2,1 − (−β0,1)− (−β1,1)z1,1)dv1,
where the second equality follows from the symmetry of φ(·) and the third equality
follows from the change of variables. Hence, if h0 and (β0,1, β1,1)
T can generate the
data, then h˜0 and (−β0,1,−β1,1)
T such that h˜0(y, v) = h0(y,−v) for all y and v can
generate the data too.
Proposition 3.1 only identifies h0 up to the distribution of unobservables. In par-
ticular, under Assumption 3, h0 is identified up to {β0,i(·), β1,i(·)}
dv
i=1. The following
assumption allows us to identify the distribution of unobservables and thus h0.
Let z1,−i = (z1,k)k 6=i. For a fixed y
∗ ∈ Y ∗, z1,−i and z2, let η : Z1,i|w,z1,−i,z2 → [0, 1]
be such that for x = ((z1,i, z1,−i)
T, zT2 , w
T)T
η(z1,i) = µ(y
∗|x).
Assumption 4 For every w ∈ W and i = 1, 2, . . . , dy, there exists y
∗ ∈ Y ∗ and
z2,i ∈ Z2,i|w \ {0} such that η(·) is neither an exponential nor an affine function of
10
z1,i.
Assumption 4 means that if we fix all covariates but one, then the probability
of observing one excluded outcome conditional on covariates is neither affine nor
exponential function of the non-fixed covariate. Assumption 4 is not very restrictive
since it rules out only some exponential and linear probability models. Moreover, it
is testable.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3, and 4 hold. Then h0 and {β0,i(·), β1,i(·)}
dv
i=1
are identified.
Proposition 4.1 establishes identification of h0 and Fv|x for normally distributed
latent variables. Next I will show how one can use h0 in different discrete outcome
models.
5. Applications
5.1. Multinomial Choice
Consider the following random coefficients model. The agent has to choose be-
tween J inside goods and an outside option of no purchase. That is, y ∈ Y =
{0, 1, . . . , J}. I normalize the utility from alternative y = 0 to 0. The random utility
from choosing an alternative y 6= 0 is of the form
uy = z2,y
[
β0(w) + β1(w)z1 + e1
]
+ gy. (3)
The random coefficient
[
β0(w) + β1(w)z1 + e1
]
represents individual specific hetero-
geneous tastes associated with product characteristic z2,y. The latent random vector
g = (gy)y∈Y \{0} captures other sources of unobserved heterogeneity which are dif-
ferent from
[
β0(w) + β1(w)z1 + e1
]
. The observed covariates are x = (z1, z
T
2 ,w
T)T,
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where z2 = (z2,y)y∈Y \{0}. Assume that the agents are utility maximizers.
13
Assumption 5 (i) e1 is an independent of (g
T,xT)T standard normal random vari-
able;
(ii) β1(w) 6= 0 a.s.;
(iii) For every w ∈W the support of z|w = w, Zw, contains an open ball.
Similarly to the existing treatment of random coefficients model, I assume that
the random coefficients in front of z2,y are the same for each alternative y.
14 However,
I do not impose sign restrictions on
[
β0(w) + β1(w)z1 + e1
]
. Note that
Pr(β0(w) + β1(w)z1 + e1 ≥ 0|x = x) = Φ(β0(w) + β1(w)z1),
where Φ(·) is the standard normal c.d.f. Thus, since there are no restrictions on
β0(·), the random coefficient
[
β0(w) + β1(w)z1 + e1
]
can be positive (negative) with
probability that is arbitrarily close to 1.
Assumption 6 (i) Random shocks g are conditionally independent of z condi-
tional on w = w. That is, for all x = (zT, wT)T ∈ X
Fg|z,w(·|z, w) = Fg|w(·|w),
where Fg|z,w(·|z, w) and Fg|w(·|w) are conditional c.d.fs of g|z = z,w = w and
g|w = w, respectively;
(ii) For every w ∈ W , there exists z2 6= 0 such that it is contained in Z2|w with
some open neighborhood and z2,y = z2,y′ for any y, y
′ ∈ Y \ {0};
(iii) For every w ∈W there exists z2 ∈ Z2|w such that
Pr(y = 0|z1 = ·, z2 = z2,w = w)
13The results below hold even if utility maximizing behavior is not assumed as long as Assump-
tion 1 is satisfied for at least one outcome.
14The model extends to the case when the random slope coeffcient is choice specific as in As-
sumption 3. But in this case one would need to find more excluded covariates.
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is neither exponential nor affine function.
Assumption 6(i) together with utility maximizing behavior guarantees that As-
sumption 1 is satisfied. Assumption 6(i) is the only restriction on g. I allow g to be
discrete or continuous random variable with unknown support. Assumptions 6(ii)-
(iii) are testable restrictions. Assumptions 6(ii) imply that one can find z2,1 = z2,2 =
· · · = z2,J 6= 0 such that Assumption 2 is satisfied for v = z2,1(β0(w) + β1(w)z1 + e1).
Assumption 6(iii) is sufficient for Assumption 4 to hold.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose Assumptions 5 and 6 hold. Then
(i) β0(·) and β1(·) are identified;
(ii) The above model inherits all identifying properties of the following random
coefficients model:
uy = ry + gy, y 6= 0,
uy = 0, y = 0,
where r = (ry)y∈Y \{0} is an observed covariate independent of g = (gy)y∈Y \{0}
conditional on w with the conditional support
Rw =
{
r ∈ RJ : r = λz2, λ ∈ R, z2 ∈ Z2|w
}
.
Proposition 5.1 implies that the original random coefficient model can be repre-
sented in the “special-covariate-with-full-support” framework without assuming exis-
tence of such covariates. Moreover, if the set of directions that z2/ ‖z2‖ can cover is
sufficiently rich, then Rw = R
J and all the identification results that require existence
of special covariates with full support (e.g., Lewbel (2000), Berry and Haile (2009),
and Fox and Gandhi (2016)) can be applied. For instance, if {z2/ ‖z2‖ : z2 ∈ Z2|w} is
equal to a unit sphere in RJ for every w, then Rw = R
J and I can nonparametrically
identify Fg|w.
15
15In general, I can identify Fg|w(·|w) over Rw only.
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5.2. Bundles
Consider the following bundles model motivated by Gentzkow (2007), Dunker
et al. (2017), and Fox and Lazzati (2017). There are J goods and the agent can
purchase any bundle consisting of these goods. The vector y describes the purchasing
decision of the agent. That is, y ∈ Y = {0, 1}J . For instance, y = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)T
corresponds to the case when the agent purchased a bundle of goods 2 and 4. I
normalize the utility from “not buying”, y = 0, to 0. The random utility from
choosing an alternative y 6= 0 is of the form
uy = (β0(w) + β1(w)z1 + e1)
J∑
j=1
yjz2,j + gy. (4)
Although the model (4) looks similar to the model (3), there is one important
difference: there is no bundle specific covariate since z2,j affects not only the utility
from buying good j alone, but also every bundle that includes it.
Proposition 5.2 Suppose Assumptions 5 and 6 hold. Then
(i) β0(·) and β1(·) are identified;
(ii) The above model inherits all identifying properties of the following bundles
model:
uy =
J∑
j=1
yjrj + gy ,
u0 = 0.
where r = (rj)j=1,...,J is an observed covariate independent of g = (gy)y∈Y \{0}
conditional on w with the conditional support
Rw =
{
r ∈ RJ : r = λz2, λ ∈ R, z2 ∈ Z2|w
}
.
Note that for J = 2 if one assumes that
g(1,0) = f1(w) + ǫ1,
14
g(0,1) = f2(w) + ǫ2,
g(1,1) = g(1,0) + g(0,1) + ξf3(w),
where fi(·), i = 1, 2, 3, are some unknown functions, and (ǫ1, ǫ2, ξ)
T ∈ R2×R+, then
model (3) is equivalent to the one in Fox and Lazzati (2017), and one can apply their
Theorem 1 to identify fi(·), i = 1, 2, 3, and the distributions of ǫi|w, i = 1, 2, and
ξ|w.
5.3. Binary games of complete information
In the multinomial choice and the bundles models I am able to establish identifi-
cation of the objects of interest without requiring covariates with full support. The
example that is considered in this section is different: the model is not pointiden-
tified. However, the Lebesgue measure of the identified set is zero. In particular,
all parameters of the model are identified up to a finite-dimensional parameter of
lower-dimension.
There are ‖I‖ <∞ players indexed by i ∈ I. Every player must choose yi ∈ {0, 1}.
Thus, the outcome space is Y = {0, 1}‖I‖.16 Players i’s payoff from choosing action
yi when the other agents are choosing y−i is given by
pi0i(y) =

α0,i(w) + [β0,i(w)zi + ei] + ∑
j∈I\{i}
δ0,i,j(w)yj

 yi,
where ei, i ∈ I, are observed by players but unobserved by the econometrician shocks;
α0,i(·), β0,i(·) and δ0,i,j(·) are unknown functions. The econometrician observes a
joint distribution of (y,xT)T, where x = (zT,wT)T ∈ X with z = (zi)i∈I , is a vector
of observed covariates. Let β0(·) = (β0,i(·))i∈I , α0(·) = (α0,i(·))i∈I , and δ0(·) =
(δ0,i,j(·))i6=j∈I .
The following two assumptions are sufficient for Assumptions 1 and 2.
Assumption 7 (i) Assumption 1 is satisfied with v = (β0,i(w)zi + ei)i∈I ;
16I work with binary action spaces for ease of exposition. The result can be extended to multiple
players and actions games.
15
(ii) For every i, j ∈ I, i 6= j, the cardinality of
{(
0
)
k∈I
,
(
1 ( k ∈ {i, j} )
)
k∈I
,
(
1 (k = i )
)
k∈I
,
(
1 (k = j )
)
k∈I
}⋂
Y ∗
is at least 2.
Assumption 7(i) implies that excluded covariates affect the distribution of some
outcomes via payoffs only. Assumption 7(ii) imposes restrictions on the set of those
outcomes. If one thinks of an entry game where yi = 1 corresponds to the en-
try decision, the outcomes in Assumption 7(ii) have the following interpretation.
The outcome
(
0
)
k∈I
corresponds to the market where nobody enters. The outcome(
1 (k ∈ {i, j} )
)
k∈I
corresponds to the market where only players i and j enter. Sim-
ilarly,
(
1 (k = i )
)
k∈I
means that only players i enters. Note that although the
cardinality of Y is 2‖I‖ , the cardinality of Y ∗ can be as low as ‖I‖+ 1.
Assumption 8 (i) The shocks {ei}i∈I are i.i.d. standard normal random variables
and independent of x;
(ii) β0,i(w) 6= 0 a.s. for all i ∈ I;
(iii) For every w ∈W , the support of z|w = w, Zw, contains an open ball.
Assumption 8 is a parametric restriction on the distribution of payoffs. It is
satisfied by the parametrization used in Bajari et al. (2010) and Ciliberto and Tamer
(2009).
I consider three complete information equilibrium/solution concepts: (i) minimax
play, (ii) “collusive” behavior, and (iii) rationalizability. Under minimax solution
concept every player picks the action that maximizes her minimum possible payoff.
Under “collusive” behavior players play the outcome that maximizes the sum of indi-
vidual profits. Under rationalizability players play any action that survives iterated
strict dominance elimination. The most commonly used solution concept of Nash
equilibrium is nested within rationalizability. Hence, all identification results that
are derived under rationalizability are valid for Nash equilibrium (both in pure and
mixed strategies).
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(a) minimax
c2
c1
(0,0) (1,0)
(0,1) (1,1)
(b) “collusion”
b2
a2
b1a1
(1,1)
(0,1)
(1,0)
(0,0)
(c) rationalizability
b˜2
a˜2
b˜1a˜1
(1,1)
(0,1)
(1,0)
(0,0)
mixture
Figure 1 – Predictions for different realizations of v when δ0,1,2 < 0 and δ0,2,1 < 0 in a
two player game.
These three solution concepts have different implications for identification. For
instance, in the two player case, if players display “collusive” behavior, then there
is no hope of separate identification of “competition” effects δ0,i,j. At best, one can
identify δ0,1,2 + δ0,2,1. Fortunately, it is possible to distinguish between these three
models up to β0(·) since under Assumptions 7 and 8 I am able to nonparametrically
recover h0 up β0(·).
Figure 1 illustrates predictions in a two player binary game for different real-
izations of v when δ0,1,2 < 0 and δ0,2,1 < 0. The thresholds ai, bi, ci, i = 1, 2, are
determined by α0,i and δ0,i,j , i, j = 1, 2. If one can identify h0 for two outcomes, say
(0, 0) and (1, 1), then one can distinguish between all three equilibrium concepts as
long as the following three conditions are satisfied.
(a1, a2)
T 6= (b1, b2)
T (minimax vs. collusion), (5)
(a˜1, a˜2)
T 6= (b˜1, b˜2)
T (minimax vs. rationalizability), (6)
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b˜2 − a˜2
b˜1 − a˜1
6=
b2 − a2
b1 − a1
(rationalizability vs. collusion). (7)
Conditions (5)-(7) hold if δ20,1,2(w) 6= δ
2
0,2,1(w) for some w ∈W . Thus, if I can identify
the correct solution concept, then I can recover the threshold values. For instance,
if I know that agents play rationalizable strategies, then I can identify a˜i, b˜i, i = 1, 2.
Since a˜i = −α0,i, and b˜i = −α0,i − δ0,i,j , i, j = 1, 2, I also can identify α0 and δ0.
The above intuition generalizes to games with more than two players, more than
two actions, and without any sign restrictions on δ0,i,j. The following result estab-
lishes identification in binary games.
Proposition 5.3 Under Assumptions 7 and 8
(i) If there exist i, j ∈ I, i 6= j, such that Pr(δ20,i,j(w) 6= δ
2
0,j,i(w)) > 0, then one
can determine whether players behave according to minimax play, “collusive”
behavior, or rationalizability up to β0(·);
(ii) If players behave according to rationalizability, then α0(·) and δ0(·) are identified
up to β0(·);
(iii) If players behave according to “collusive” behavior, then α0(·) and {δ0,i,j(·) + δ0,j,i(·)}i6=j∈I
are identified up to β0(·);
(iv) If players behave according to minimax play, then {α0,i(·) + min{δ0,i,j(·), 0}}i6=j∈I
are identified up to β0(·).
Proposition 5.3 states that if marginal effects of some excluded covariates on
payoffs are known, then one can identify the solution concept, together with some
(or sometimes all) payoff parameters. Assumption 8(i) implies that the errors in
payoffs are not correlated. I can allow for unknown variance covariance matrix V .
In this case all objects in Proposition 5.3 are identified up to β0(·) and V .
Full identification in this binary game can be achieved if one can identify β0(·).
The standard identification-at-infinity argument requires existence of player-action-
specific covariates that have full support (unbounded from above and below). How-
ever, the full support assumption is only needed to separately identify the intercepts
of the mean utilities (α0 and δ0). In contrast, in order to identify β0 one only needs
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to have player-action-specific covariates with unbounded support (e.g., unbounded
from above only).17 In other words, full identification can be achieved in a substan-
tially bigger set of applications (e.g., prices or income can potentially take arbitrary
large positive values, but cannot be negative).18
6. Conclusion
This paper shows that commonly used exclusion restrictions and parametric as-
sumptions about the distribution of some unobservables may lead to identification
in discrete outcome models. The proposed identification framework allows one to ex-
tend the results from a large literature that uses special covariates with full support
to environments where such full-support covariates are not available.
The partial identification result can substantially decrease computational com-
plexity of constructing confidence sets for partially identified parameters. For in-
stance, the likelihood ratio statistic of Chen et al. (2011) is asymptotically χ2 dis-
tributed after profiling β0 under the null hypothesis, since the model in this case is
identified. Thus, there is no need to use bootstrap and one can take critical values
from χ2 distribution.
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A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 3.1
Fix some y ∈ Y ∗ and w ∈ W (for brevity I will drop w in the notation below).
Under Assumption 1 I have the following integral equation
∀z ∈ Z : µ(y|z) =
∫
V
h(y∗, v)dFv|z(v|z).
Suppose that there exists h with h(y∗, v) 6= h0(y
∗, v) for all v in some nonzero measure
set V ′ such that
∀z ∈ Z : µ(y|z) =
∫
V
h(y∗, v)dFv|z(v|z) =
∫
V
h0(y
∗, v)dFv|z(v|z).
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Which implies that the nonzero function h(y, ·)−h0(y, ·) integrates to 0 for all z ∈ Z
′.
The latter contradicts to Assumption 2. The fact that the choice of y and w was
arbitrary completes the proof.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 4.1
Note that Proposition 3.1 implies that h0 is identified up to {β0,i(·), β1,i(·)}
dv
i=1.
Hence, I only need to show that {β0,i(·), β1,i(·)}
dv
i=1 is identified.
Fix some w, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , dv}, z2,−i, z1,−i, and take y
∗ from Assumption 4. To
simplify notation let F0 : R→ R and η : R
2 → R such that
F0(vi) =
∫
Rdv−1
h0(y
∗, w, v)
∏
k 6=i
φ (vk/z2,k − β0,k(w)− β1,k(w)z1,k)
z2,k
dvk,
where φ(·) is the standard normal p.d.f., and η(z1,i, z2,i) = µ(y
∗|z, w).
Assumptions 1 and 3 imply that
η(z1,i, z2,i) =
∫
R
F0(vi)
φ(vi/z2,i − β0,i − β1,iz1,i)
z2,i
dvi,
After dropping index i from the notation and some rearrangements I get
η˜(z1, z2) =
∫
R
F0(t)φ(t/z2 − β0 − β1z1)dt, (8)
where η˜(z1, z2) = z2η(z1, z2).
Next, note that since φ′′(x) = −φ(x) − xφ′(x) the following system of equations
holds
∂z1 η˜(z1, z2) = −β1
∫
F0(t)φ
′(t/z2 − β0 − β1z1)dt,
∂2z2
1
η˜(z1, z2) = β
2
1
∫
F0(t)φ
′′(t/z2 − β0 − β1z1)dt = −β
2
1 η˜(z1, z2)− β1(β0 + β1z1)∂z1 η˜(z1, z2)−
− β21
∫
tF0(t)φ
′(t/z2 − β0 − β1z1)dt/z2;
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Moreover,
∂z2 η˜(z1, z2) = −
∫
F0(t)tφ
′(t/z2 − β0 − β1z1)dt/z
2
2 .
Hence,
∂2z2
1
η˜(z1, z2) = −β
2
1 η˜(z1, z2)− β1(β0 + β1z1)∂z1 η˜(z1, z2) + β
2
1z2∂z2 η˜(z1, z2);
Equivalently
β0
β1
=
z2∂z2 η˜(z1, z2)− η˜(z1, z2)
∂z1 η˜(z1, z2)
− z1 −
∂2z2 η˜(z1, z2)
∂z1 η˜(z1, z2)
1
β21
.
Thus, β0/β1 is identified up to β
2
1 . Moreover, the last equality implies that β
2
1 is
identified if for some z2 and z1
∂z1
(
∂z2
1
η˜(z1, z2)
∂z1 η˜(z1, z2)
)
6= 0.
Suppose this is not the case. That is, for all z2 and z1
∂2z2
1
(log(∂z1 η˜(z1, z2))) = 0.
The latter would imply that either
η˜(z1, z2) = K1(z2)e
K2(z2)z1 +K3(z2)
or
η˜(c, z) = K4(z2)z1 +K3(z2)
for some functions Ki(·), i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Since it is assumed that η˜(·, z2) = z2η(·, z2)
is neither exponential nor affine function, I can conclude that β21 is identified (hence,
|β1| is also identified). Hence, I identify β0/β1. If β0/β1 = 0, then the sign of β1 is
identified from Assumption 3(iv). If β0/β1 6= 0, then the sign of either β1 or β0 is
identified from Assumption 3(iv). Knowing the sign of, say, β0 and β0/β1 identifies
β1 and β0.
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A.3. Proof of Propositions 5.1 and 5.2
(i). Note that under Assumption 6.(ii) there exists z2 with some open neighbour-
hood such that z2,y = z2,y′ for all y, y
′ ∈ Y . Let
v1 = −z2,1(β0(w) + β1(w)z1 + e1) a.s..
Assumption 5 implies that Assumptions 3(i)-(iii) are satisfied for the above v1. More-
over,
Pr(y = 0|x = x) =
∫
R
Fg|w(−z2,1(β0(w)+β1(w)z1+e1), . . . ,−z2,1(β0(w)+β1(w)z1+e1)|w)φ(e1)de1
identifies the sign of β1(w) since Fg|w(·|w) is weakly monotone. Thus, Assump-
tion 3(iv) is also satisfied.
Assumption 1 is satisfied for Y ∗ = {0} and for h(0, w, v) = Fg|w(v, v, ·, v|w).
Assumption 4 is implied by Assumption 6. Hence, by Proposition 3.1 β0(·) and β1(·)
are identified.
(ii). Since β0(·) and β1(·) are identified I can redefine the index v. Let
v = β0(w) + β1(w)z1 + e1 a.s..
Note that
Pr(y = 0|x = x) =
∫
R
Fg|w(−z2,1v, . . . ,−z2,Jv|w)φ(v − β0(w) + β1(w)z1)dv =
=
∫
R
h(z2, w, v)φ(v − β0(w) + β1(w)z2)dv
Since assumption of Proposition 3.1 are satisfied I pointidentify
h(z2, w, v) = Fg|w(−z2,1v, . . . ,−z2,Y v|w)
for all z2, w, v. Note that since v can take any value in R for any direction −z2/ ‖z2‖
in the support of z2 I can recover Fg|w(g|w) for any g such that g = −z2v/ ‖z2‖ for
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some v ∈ R. That is, I identify Fg|w(·|w) over the set
Rw =
{
r ∈ RJ : r = λz2, λ ∈ R, z2 ∈ Z2|w
}
.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 5.3
First, I fix some w ∈ W and for notation simplicity I drop dependence on w.
Since assumptions of Proposition 3.1 are satisfied, I identify
Pr(y = y|v = ·) = h0(y, ·)
for all y ∈ Y ∗. Since v ∈ R‖I‖ and vi enters only payoffs of player i, I can make
a payoff of any player arbitrary small (“close” to −∞). Hence, under all solution
concepts under consideration I can force any player to choose yi = 0. Take any two
players i 6= j and consider
h0,i,j(y, vi, vj) = lim
vk→−∞,k∈I\{i,j}
h0(y, v)
for all y ∈ Y ∗ and vi, vj . Note that h0,i,j corresponds to a two player binary game
with payoffs
[α0,i + δ0,i,jyj + vi] yi
and
[α0,j + δ0,j,iyi + vj ] yj.
Moreover, by Assumption 7(ii), in this two player game at least two outcomes from
{(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}
satisfy exclusion restrictions. Assume that (0, 0) and (1, 1) satisfy the exclusion
restriction (the proof for any other case, e.g., (0, 0) and (1, 0), is almost the same).
To discriminate between solution concepts I analyze their predictions about out-
comes (0, 0) and (1, 1). Without loss of generality let i = 1 and j = 2.
Case 1. Suppose that agents are behaving according to minimax play. Then
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v2
v1
c2
c1
(0,0) (1,0)
(0,1) (1,1)
Figure 2 – Minimax correspondences for different values of v.
v2
v1
b2
a2
b1a1
(1,1)
(0,1)
(1,0)
(0,0)
Figure 3 – “Collusive” correspondences for different realizations of v when δ0,1,2 +
δ0,2,1 < 0.
for any α0,1, α0,2, δ0,1,2, and δ0,2,1, the predictions about outcomes (0, 0) and (1, 1)
depending on the value of (v1, v2)
T ∈ R2 can be depicted as in Figure 2, where
c1 = −α0,1 −min{δ0,1,2, 0} and c2 = −α0,2 −min{δ0,2,1, 0}
Case 2. Suppose that agents are behaving according to “collusive” solution con-
cept. Then for any α0,1, α0,2, δ0,1,2, and δ0,2,1, the predictions about outcomes (0, 0)
and (1, 1) depending on the value of v ∈ R2 can be depicted as in figures 3-4, where
a1 = −α0,1, a2 = −α0,2, b1 = −α0,1 − (δ0,1,2 + δ0,2,1), and b2 = −α0,2 − (δ0,1,2 + δ0,2,1).
Case 3. Suppose that agents are playing rationalizable strategies. Then for any
α0,1, α0,2, δ0,1,2, and δ0,2,1, the predictions about outcomes (0, 0) and (1, 1) depending
on the value of v ∈ R2 can be depicted as in figures 5-8, where a1 = −α0,1, a2 = −α0,2,
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Figure 4 – “Collusive” correspondences for different realizations of v when δ0,1,2 +
δ0,2,1 > 0.
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Figure 5 – Rationalizable correspondences for different realizations of v when δ0,1,2 < 0
and δ0,2,1 < 0.
b1 = −α0,1 − δ0,1,2, and b2 = −α0,2 − δ0,2,1.
As a result, minimax is consistent with the data if and only if h0,i,j((0, 0), ·) and
h0,i,j((1, 1), ·) match Figure 2. If h0,i,j((0, 0), ·) and h0,i,j((1, 1), ·) match Figure 7 or
Figure 8, then only rationalizability can explain the data. There is still a possibility
that h0,i,j((0, 0), ·) and h0,i,j((1, 1), ·) match Figure 3 and Figure 5, or Figure 4 and
Figure 6. Hence, one might think that rationalizability and “collusive” behavior both
can explain the data. However, since in Proposition 5.3(i) I assume that there exist
two players such that δ20,i,j 6= δ
2
0,j,i, the “multiplicity” region under rationalizability
is never a square (the lengths of the region are ‖δ0,1,2‖ and ‖δ0,2,1‖). In contrast,
under “collusive” behavior the “multiplicity” region is always a square (the lengths
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Figure 6 – Rationalizable correspondences for different realizations of v when δ0,1,2 > 0
and δ0,2,1 > 0.
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Figure 7 – Rationalizable correspondences for different realizations of v when δ0,1,2 > 0
and δ0,2,1 < 0.
of the region are ‖δ0,1,2 + δ0,2,1‖ and ‖δ0,1,2 + δ0,2,1‖). Thus by analyzing these two
“asymmetric” players I can determine the correct solution concept.
If I determined that the correct solution concept is minimax, then at most I can
identify α0,1 +min{δ0,1, 0} and α0,2 +min{δ0,2, 0}. If the correct solution concept is
“collusive” behavior, then I can pointidentify α0,1, α0,2, and δ0,1,2 + δ0,2,2. If agents
play rationalizable strategies, then I can pointidentify all payoff parameters.
The result then follows from the fact that the choice of players i, j and w ∈ W
was arbitrary.
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Figure 8 – Rationalizable correspondences for different realizations of v when δ0,1,2 < 0
and δ0,2,1 > 0.
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